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
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SCOTTISH ETHNICITY
SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN GREAT BRITAIN

by

W. Travis Hall

Special Seminar Paper submitted to the Faculty of the
Defense Intelligence College in partial fulfillment of the
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
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
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

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Map 2 Regions and Districts of Scotland (1975-)

Source: Kellas, Modern Scotland

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the coronation of Elizabeth as Queen of the United Kindom and the Commonwealth in 1952, a number of postal pillar boxes were blown up in Glasgow. Reportedly, the rationale was because they bore the imprint "EIIR" symbolizing the new monarch. A reason forwarded for the action was because the militants found the inscription an affront to the Scots; the first Queen Elizabeth not only stole the throne, but she also had Mary, the true queen beheaded.¹

This little act of violence, insignificant compared to some of the activities in Northern Ireland, is just an indicator of the unique strain of Scottish Nationalism. Although the Scots and English have been united for over 250 years, most residents would not accept being identified as British, but would prefer to be thought of as Scots.²

That there is a Scottish ethnicity cannot be denied. The problem arises in determining the character of this ethnicity and its impact on the United Kingdom. The contribution that the Scots made to the building of the British Empire is far out of proportion to their numerical inferiority. Except in negative terms, it would be unfair to refer to them as the junior partners of the Union.

In recent times, with the discovery of oil only 125 miles east of Aberdeen, in the North Sea, London's concern regarding Scottish Nationalism has been extreme. According to some, Scottish national independence was a very conceivable prospect in the late 1970's. The Scotland, question coupled with Northern

Ireland's problems and Welsh Nationalism made the dissolution of Britain as a viable entity very possible.

With these considerations in mind, it is important that there is an understanding of the Scottish ethnicity and its relationship to the United Kingdom.

In this paper I will discuss selected aspects of Scotland's history, Scottish ethnicity and current issues.

The historical data will focus mainly on those areas which are of relevance to the development of the Scottish character. These include the Act of Union, that is the political joining of the Scottish and English peoples; economic development, with emphasis on the building of the Empire; and political consequences.

The ethnic character of the Scots will be examined. This will include a discussion on the importance of the "classic" ethnic values of religion, language and culture. General concepts of nationalism, ethnicity, and the relation of Scots Nationalism to political movements will be evaluated.

Economic circumstances affecting Scottish Nationalism will be taken into consideration. Though Scots possess a strong sense of ethnicity, I propose that economic instability is one of the major factors in the resurgence of Scottish Nationalism in the 1970's. It is during times of economic stress that political activity is strongest in Scotland. The development and importance of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) will also be considered. Additionally, the effect of the media with regards to worldwide nationalist movements will be reviewed.

A HISTORICAL BRIEF

Jack Brand, a noted Scottish political scientist, contends that Scottish Nationalism is more often described not by what it is, but rather by what it is not. Race, language, and religion are not firm bases to develop a theory of ethnicity in this case. History, however, does seem to bear heavily on the rise of nationalism and the feeling of oneness or community. This shared history gives the people their sense of separateness.³

The history of Scotland and the United Kingdom is long, complex, and colorful. This brief view of the island's history will concentrate on just a few of the major events which helped form the Scottish character. Pertinent points brought out in this summary will be developed later in the paper as they bear on aspects such as emigration, economics, and politics.

Pre-Union: History to 1707

The earliest days of recorded Scot's history find the area of northern Britain inhabited by numerous tribes of independent Picts, Irish Celts, Vikings, Scots, Britons, Angles, Normans, and Flems. It is an indication of the barbarous nature of these peoples that the Romans never conquered nor peacefully colonized the area. Violence, death, and destruction forged, these diverse peoples into a loose federation around the 8th or 9th century of the Christian era. Historians will argue who, exactly, united these warring tribes, but for our purposes it is enough to understand that they were eventually brought under one leader, and it occurred independently; without outside assistance. That

is to say the Scots were founded through internal struggle, not by colonization or foreign intervention. Of equal importance to the question of ethnicity is the point that there was a Scottish state prior to the nation.⁴

The succeeding four hundred years or so would be a period when Scotland would be molded into a nation. During this time, numerous altercations with the English, Scotland's unfriendly neighbor to the south, would occur. These confrontations were a contributing factor in developing the Scots as a people.

The wars were not continuous affairs, however, and Scotland and England were in fact joined through the union of the monarchy. For perhaps a hundred turbulent years before the formation of the United Kingdom, intermarriage within the ruling houses produced such interesting individuals as Mary, Queen of Scots; James VI, King of Scotland, who went south and was crowned James I, King of England; Charles II, who ruled England and Scotland briefly after Cromwell's Commonwealth; and James II.⁵ It is important to note that though the crowns were united, both countries retained separate, distinct governments.

James II should be illuminated at this point. Briefly, he served as the King of England and Scotland until 1688 when he was driven from the throne in a bloodless revolution. From his sanctuary in France, he enlisted the aid of the highland lairds for a bid to regain the crown. These nobles and their French supporters were called Jacobites. This force was vanquished, but the distrust of the Scottish Jacobites would last. France was to continue to be an important influence in Scotland for some time.⁶

Union of 1707

The union of the kingdoms was officially declared in 1707. This joining of the governments of Scotland and England would see the dissolving of the Scottish Parliament and the formation of the new Parliament of Great Britain, seated in London. It is at this point in history that Scotland as a separate political entity voluntarily ceased to exist.⁷ Numerous factors involving Scottish Nationalism are centered around this Act; thus it should be discussed in some detail here.

The Act of Union in 1707 was a joint declaration by both England and Scotland that for their mutual benefit they could no longer afford to be contentious or competitive.

As mentioned earlier, the union involved the dissolving of Scotland's legislative body and its allegiance under one King and court. Scotland would retain certain functions in the public sector. Specifically, Scottish legal, religious, and educational institutions would be administered locally. The legislative and executive direction would come from Westminster, but it would be administered by Scottish departments and ministers.⁸ Scotland relinquished control of foreign affairs, defense, major economic functions, and national justice to the new government in London.⁹

The retention of the Kirk, law, and education systems is important in understanding Scottish Nationalism. Milton Esman, professor of international studies at Cornell, contends that the lack of a strong thrust to Scottish nationalism can be traced to the granting of those culturally critical social factors and a common language.¹⁰ Dov Ronen concurs that the Scots, having a

recognizable separate national identity from England as a functional aggregation with their own legal, educational, and religious institutions, did not need to reaffirm their separateness.¹¹

The Union, like most joint ventures, had positive and negative aspects, often depending on the side of the border on which one was located. England, though largely indifferent to her neighbor to the north, feared a revival of a Scottish-French alliance.¹² For France's part, a strong United Kingdom was not in her best interest, having an antagonistic relationship with England much of the time.¹³

This situation was made manifest in less than half a century when France aided the Highland Jacobites in an attempt to return a Stuart to the Throne of the United Kingdom. The sojourn of Charles Edmund Stuart, "Bonnie Prince Charlie", culminating at the Battle of Culladen Moor in 1746, would be the last rebellious act of Scotland as a nation.¹⁴

For the Scots, Union was a mixed blessing. One of the conditions for Union was that England would pay off the considerable expenses of Scotland's aborted attempt at colonizing the New World. Also, under the auspices of the Union, Scots would be able to benefit from Britain's new imperialism; an opportunity which had not been open to them before.¹⁵ Also, as Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper notes, "(all) intelligent Scotsmen rejoiced at the removal of their national politics to London, and got on with the apolitical business of improving their country."¹⁶

Union was not popular with everyone in Scotland, however. A form of federation would probably have been preferred. Greater assimilation might have brought a more efficient bureaucracy. Instead, they got indifferent representation at Westminster.¹⁷

Industrialization and Empire Building

The period extending from the middle of the 18th century through World War I saw the development of a Scotland inexorably linked with England. This was the age of industrialization and the building of the British Empire.

Industrialization came to Scotland, as to England, through the textile mills. The mills were developed in the lowlands and border areas where the Lairds were more concerned with economic integration than politics. The industries were predominantly funded by the Scottish aristocracy. The mills and coal mines provided employment to only a portion of the available work force. Even at this early stage of development, the Scottish worker's salary was substantially lower than that of his English counterpart. These two factors contributed to the large numbers of emigrants out of Scotland.¹⁸ Industrialization progressed rapidly, especially in the Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Lothian regions. However, even with the emergence of the iron and shipbuilding industries, the economic situation, especially for the lower classes, was uncertain.

British imperialism provided an outlet for Scots of all social classes. While the upper and middle classes sent their sons abroad to manage plantations and administer governments in the Colonies, the lower classes filled the ranks of the Scottish

regiments abroad. This whole-hearted joining with the English in empire building would combine with other factors to create a noticeable drain on the population.¹⁹ This will be discussed in a later section of the paper. Suffice to say, with the increase of colonial commerce into the country and the manufacturing and shipbuilding industries, prosperity flourished.

Tom Nairn condenses the Scottish-English relationship during this period:

The union bargain worked as it had been intended to. Indeed, it far surpassed the hopes placed in it. During the prolonged era of Anglo-Scots imperialist expansion, the Scottish ruling order found that it had given up statehood for a hugely profitable junior partnership in "the New Rome."²⁰

Esman continues this thought by noting, "The profits of empire flowed back to Scotland, and during the latter part of the nineteenth century, Glasgow was probably the richest city in the World."²¹

The Twentieth Century

The first World War and negative economic processes brought on an irreversible decline. Ill-advised investment in heavy industries and competition for traditional markets left many factories idle. New markets for the excess capacity of the broadened industrial base were not found. In addition, new technologies in the transport industry, a staple for Scotland, were not utilized. Between the wars, unemployment ran anywhere from 10 percent to as much as 25 percent. Link these forces with a new awareness of the

struggle of the classes, and you have a very disoriented society.²²

Politically, this was the period when the embryonic Scottish National Party (SNP) was started. Founded in 1928 as the National Party of Scotland, it would spearhead the new Nationalist movement and for the next 50-plus years be the prime motivator for Scottish separatism.²³ The home rule movement was in vogue for a while during this period, but it faded into relative obscurity when it could not come up with a solution to the economic problems that plagued the country.²⁴ Bids for home rule would continue to be heard sporadically for the next 40 years.

Post-World War II Era

Scottish regiments fought with valor as part of the British Armed Forces during the Second World War. Though Scots pride was evident, they fought as Britons. The post-war years saw many radical changes for the empire and the world. During the period between 1945 and 1970, over 30 states or colonies changed their status in relation to the United Kingdom (see Table 1). This divestiture of former holdings, coupled with the general worldwide creation of new states, would have a profound effect on Scottish Nationalism.

The economic recession, which had run from the early 1950's into the 1970's, was acutely felt by the Scots. Emigration of unemployed Scots, especially to England, reached critical proportions. For example, 47,000 Scots

sought employment south of the border in 1965-66 alone.²⁵ Nationalism again became a factor in Scottish politics. Industrial recession in the north can be blamed for only part of the problem. Dov Ronen contends that other factors were involved. With the independent status of so many of Britain's colonies, the colonial service was no longer an opportunity for Scottish employment. Ronen also contends that the media reinforced the perception of nationalism a great deal.²⁶ The dormant SNP once again campaigned under the banner of separatism, this time with considerably more success. Though not an igniter for the nationalist cause of home rule or devolution, the discovery of vast fields of oil off the coast of Scotland gave fuel to the movement. First the Scots visualized the oil as their economic salvation. They then perceived that it would give them more political clout when dealing with the English. With more public support than had ever been demonstrated in the past, the nationalist movement in Scotland and the Labor Government at Westminster put legislation before Parliament in 1974. Called the "Devolution" Bill, it was intended to give (devolve) some form of self-government back to the people of Scotland. The bill was considered by many to be the first step in the process of gaining independence for the Scots. Through typical English disregard for Scottish affairs and inept handling, the Bill did not make it out of committee. When it was finally resurrected and put to the vote in Scotland in 1979, the Scottish electorate rejected the bill

for devolution by a substantial margin. The majority of Scots, it seems, did not really want total independence from the United Kingdom.

Historical Conclusion

Scottish ethnicity is based on its history as much as any other consideration. Scotland was an independent nation-state prior to union with England. A major part of Scotland's cultural heritage was developed prior to 1707. The Act of Union between the two countries was unique in some respects. The Union provided Scottish retention of key culturally influential institutions, including the local government and law, the Kirk, and the school system. Since Scotland was not a conquered country, there was no the stigma of military defeat and racial hatred occupation forces often bring. This is not to say that the English and Scots did not have their cultural biases. Of course, Scotland was not colonized. English interest in Scotland was not nearly as great as her interest in her revenue producing colonies abroad.²⁷ The nineteenth century saw Scottish growth through industrialization, world commerce, and colonial involvement. Anglicization and integration forces were very strong at the time. Late in the 19th century, economic factors stunted Scottish industrial growth and Scotland entered the twentieth century with an unstable economy. Throughout this period, Scot pride was evident, but nationalism and a strong political identity were not high priorities. Though home rule (independence) would be

put forward in the late 1800's, it was not a major political motive until after the First World War. Even then, a political structure with strength enough to carry independence was lacking. The upheavals of the post World War II era gave the SNP the impetus needed to attempt home rule, now stylishly called devolution. With the discovery of oil, Scottish separatism had added significance. Ultimately, it appears that the relative prosperity of the late 1970's has withered the nationalist fever. Scottish pride, however, continues as strong as ever.

SCOTLAND, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

As mentioned earlier, history plays a significant part in the development of Scottish ethnicity, but only a part. To understand those other forces which impact on Scottish ethnicity and nationalism, a general analysis of certain concepts is provided.

There are almost as many definitions of ethnicity as there are authorities willing to venture a definition. Harold Isaacs described the ethnic group as being "composed of what has been called primordial affinities and attachments." This is distinct from other identities which lie under the group. When a child is born, he acquires, through time, the history and origins, language, religion, and cultural values (mores, ethics, and aesthetics) of the people or community inhabiting that area where he lives.²⁸ Ethnicity can be categorized by the above identifiable characteristics; i.e. culture, language, and religion. But the core of ethnicity, according to Talcott Parsons, appears to be "temporal continuity, often reaching into the distant past." This aspect of community is "transgenerational."²⁹ The above criteria will be discussed further in relation to Scottish ethnicity.

The expressions ethnicity and nationalism appear in many texts to be used interchangeably. Using the European definition of a nation, this is correct. Much literature on Scotland's independence confuses nationalism and ethnicity with separatism. For the purposes of this paper, I will

generally refer to ethnicity as it deals with Scottish "feeling of oneness" or Scot pride. When I refer to nationalism, I will generally be putting the concept of ethnicity in a politically active context. That is to say, the unspoken sense of community is vocalized or overtly expressed and used for political purposes. Joseph Rothschild summarizes this by saying that the politicization of ethnicity translates the personal quest for meaning and belonging into a group demand for respect and power.³⁰

Using Ronen's terminology, one could equate ethnicity broadly with "functional aggregations" and their characteristics. When the discussion turns toward interaction between England and Scotland, we see the development of "conscious aggregations." This is the differentiation between "them" and "us": Nationalism implies a need to fulfill aspirations or to achieve certain aims.³¹

Though this runs counter to the broader concept of nationalism as the desire to be part of the "nation" (community), the distinction was noticeable in Scottish socio-political literature. The word separatist will be used to distinguish those individuals who wish to be politically independent from Great Britain from those nationalists who are politically advocating greater socio-economic benefits from Westminster.

The difference between nation and state is significant in the review of nationalism in Scotland. Dov Ronen

recognizes a state by five characteristics:

"territoriality, sovereignty, economic control, assumed cultural identity, and equal international status."³² The basic point to note is that a state exercises governmental control over its people. A nation, in contrast, is a group of ethnically similar individuals limited by a national awareness, culture, and sense of community.³³ Scotland was a state before it became a nation. After the Act of Union, it lost its statehood but retained its national character.

A large portion of Scottish culture had already been formed by the time of the Act of Union. As early as 1306, when Robert Bruce was on the throne, elements of a Scottish nation were evident. This nation-building was the product of a long line of strong monarchs, not racial or linguistic homogeneity.³⁴

In The Future of Scotland, Christopher Smout tells us that if there is a Scottish identity, it is not derived from race. Scots are an amalgam of the numerous migrant tribes which migrated into upper Britain.³⁵ Any sense of a racial structure developed over the centuries by intermarriage between these tribes.

Language is technically not an ethnic variable in regards to the Scots. Language is not one of the characteristics which differentiates the "us" from the "them." English has been spoken since its general acceptance by both the Scots and the English. The language was in common usage well before the Act of Union. Some will

argue that Gaelic may be a factor in ethnicity.

Interestingly, only about two percent of the Scots speak Gaelic today.³⁶

Perhaps the only way language can be considered a factor of ethnicity is if one includes dialect. The Scottish brogue invariably separates the "us" from everyone else who speaks English. In contrast, ethnicity in Wales is strongly based on the Welsh language.

Religion is another classic describer of ethnicity. Though religious strife has filled the pages of Scottish history, it is not considered a major factor in Scotland's relations with England. The church did leave a lasting impression on the Scottish character. Though originally Roman Catholic, the majority of Scots embraced Calvinism during the Reformation in the sixteenth century. The somber nature of the Kirk has, over the years made the Scots more intense than the English. The Church was also considerably more institutional than the Church of England and more directly involved in the lives of its people.³⁷

James Kellas summarizes the development of Scottish culture in three main phases. Kellas indicates that early culture was formed from the ethnic melange of the tribes inhabiting the geographic area of Scotland. From this, the Scottish state, then the nation was derived. Similar processes occurred in France, England, Spain and Portugal. The second influence was from the continent. There has always been an affinity between the French and the Scots.

Part of this was because, much of the time, they had a common enemy. One of England's primary reasons for the Union was to alleviate the threat of French troops on her northern border. Also, Scottish students, traders and mercenaries often traveled on the continent and brought back many cultural additions to the homeland. Calvinism, Roman law, Scottish architecture and much of the Scot's outlook on life come from western Europe. Kellas concludes that the third influence came through the process of anglicization.³⁸

Even taking into consideration that there was a Scottish nation-state; significant sub-cultures developed. The highlanders, the lowlanders and the island peoples, though all Scots, retained geographically derived characteristics.

The two largest segments of Scotland's population, the highlanders and the people of the lowlands illustrate the contrasts in the country. The highlanders are the stereotypical brooding, religious, hard drinking fighters. The traditional Gaelic-Scottish identity, complete with kilt, tartan and bagpipes is derived from this region. This area was effectively depopulated in the eighteenth century when the clan lairds found sheep to be more profitable than tenant farmers.³⁹ The highlands have historically been the home for the national movements.

Harvie describes a lowland Scot as "cosmopolitan, self-avowedly enlightened and (when) given a chance, authoritarian."⁴⁰ The lowland dwellers are more urbanized

and anglocized than the highlanders and appear to have profited more from their experiences with the English.

Lowland Scot or highlander, these people are ethnically complete with strong cultural and historical bonds. Though there is intense Scottish pride, it generally does not express itself in aggressive political terms. There are a number of reasons for this lack of political activism.

Probably the greatest element in retarding ethno-political activity is derived from the structure of the Act of Union. Since the inception of the United Kingdom, there has never been any question of the existence of Scotland. With the retention of their religion, laws and schools, they were deprived of many of the causes often used to build a nationalist movement.⁴¹

Contrast this with the situation in Wales. "Wales has been administered as part of England; it has enjoyed no independent political status since the Tudor Acts of Union in 1526 and 1532."⁴²

As mentioned earlier, since Scotland was neither subjugated nor colonized, the stigma of an occupation army on the home soil was not present. Actually, most of the repressive actions against the highlanders following the defeat of the Stuarts and Jacobites at Culloden in 1746 were at the hand of the lowland Scots, not the English.⁴³ The foreclosures on the lands of the highland crofters (tenant farmers) in the 19th century were usually through the actions of Scottish run banks.

Another factor, related to the Act of Union, influenced Scotland's lack of political activism. To put it quite simply, the British government had little to do with the Scots. The Union was set up in such a way that Scotland was responsible for most of the everyday administration of the region.⁴⁴ This 'laissez faire' attitude was because Britain was more concerned with developing her more profitable international holdings.

Economics was also an inhibitor for Scottish political development. Though negative economic conditions generate political activism, there appears to be little agitation when the economy is strong. Scotland, particularly in the lowlands, has traditionally shown great interest in turning a profit. The business of Scotland is business, to steal a phrase. Harvie notes that Scots' nationalism was politically impotent because it lacked the economic pressures of Ireland and Wales.⁴⁵ When economic conditions were depressed, some political activism did occur. This was ineffective mainly because the groups lacked the strength to exert any force on the government. In addition, the issues were ineptly presented by Scotland's politicians in Westminster. There was no effective leadership to coalesce the classes into a viable pressure group.⁴⁶

Another significant element working against political awareness in Scotland has been the migration of a large percentage of the population.

Among the lower classes, the migration patterns include the movement out of the highlands as the crofters were expelled from their lands in the 19th century. Early in colonial times, many of Scotland's migrants settled in Canada and the American mid-west. Additionally, the lowlands have contributed impressive numbers of workers to the English economy. Scotland's industrial base could not support the number of people available in the work force. Just as important is the fact that, on the whole, wages were perceptibly higher in England.⁴⁷

To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, Scotland lost almost 200,000 people between 1961 and 1965 alone. This is a sizeable proportion of the population for a country with just over 5 million inhabitants.⁴⁸ Some scholars calculate that as much as twenty percent of the population has emigrated since 1945.

Migration of the upper and middle classes removed large numbers from that segment of Scotland's society which traditionally would have started political movements. A large portion of the aristocracy was effectively anglicized and moved to the more cosmopolitan areas around London.⁴⁹ In addition, though Scotland has many excellent centers of learning; the landed gentry tended to send their sons to England for an education. The Scottish educational system had produced more literate people than could be used in the north; these graduates made their careers in the overseas empire during Britain's imperial heyday. "The colonial

administrator, the doctor and the trader often spoke with a Scottish accent. For the ambitious Scot,, the United Kingdom opened not only the highway to England, but also the sea-lanes to a world wide empire...."50 Critics of Scottish nationalism argue that much of the "talent" in Scotland left the country, rather than having worked to improve it.

CURRENT ISSUES

Recently, Scottish ethnicity has expressed itself more aggressively than it had at any time since the Union. In this section we will examine some of the issues which have influenced this phenomenon.

Historically, there has been a separatist movement since the the Union in 1707. Many felt that the dissolving of the Scottish Parliament would mean the end of the Scottish people through absorption. This event did not occur for a number of reasons. The fact that the Scots retained a number of their civil institutions is a major consideration. In addition, the Scots ethnic identity was too strong and well developed.

When the Scots have demonstrated their political aggressiveness, it has been most often for economic reasons or for some form of independence from England. Invariably, though there is a vocal minority, most Scots have indicated a preference to remain part of the United Kingdom and not "go it alone."

The main political motivating force for independence in the twentieth century has been the Scottish National Party (SNP). Kellas reminds us that as essential as it is to examine the SNP, it is still only a minor political party, even in relation to Scottish politics. It did, however, have an impact in the late 1960's and 1970's, and shook the complacency of the major parties.⁵¹

Though the SNP has been in existence since the early 1930's, it was not until the mid-sixties that the party saw its greatest successes. The SNP won its first seat in the House of Commons in 1945; only to lose it shortly thereafter. The movement remained relatively dormant until the late 1960's when the issue of devolution arose.⁵² In 1965, there were only 16,000 members of the SNP in all of Scotland. By 1975, they would record more than 80,000 members.⁵³ More significantly, some opinion polls showed that between 70 and 80 percent of Scottish voters perceived that the SNP was of benefit to Scotland's political strength.⁵⁴ By February, 1974, the SNP held seven seats out of a possible 71 allotted to Scotland in Commons. In the next election, in October, 11 seats went to the party.

The independence issue that the SNP had fought for was handled by London's Labour majority government with the presentation of the Devolution Bill in 1974. The original bill was misdirected and did not make it out of committee. However, devolution was still a hot issue in the 1976 and 1978 sessions of Parliament. Westminster ultimately passed a watered down Scotland Bill for vote by the Scots in 1979. Instead of total independence, the Bill called for the creation of a Scottish Assembly which would have a chief executive and legislature centered in Edinburgh. Scotland, however, would still be part of the United Kingdom. As the Bill was written, the Scots would still not have any major financial control; they could not raise revenues. Funds

would be provided by Westminster via "Block Grants." Also, foreign affairs and defense would continue to be controlled in London.⁵⁵

Westminster structured the Devolution Bill in such a way that it had to pass a referendum in Scotland with at least forty percent of the vote. The Bill was defeated by popular vote; only 33 percent voted for the Scottish Assembly and government in Edinburgh.⁵⁶

By the late 1970's, the SNP had run into hard times. They could only win two seats in Commons in 1979. Partly because of the defeats at the polls and partly because of an internal power struggle, the SNP was no longer a political force in Scotland by 1980.⁵⁷

What prompted this resurgence of Scottish political activism in the late 1960's? Just as important, what caused its demise? Numerous events must be considered for each question.

Jack Brand emphasises that social and economic conditions were responsible for the Scottish political awareness in the late 1950's and 1960's. He refers to the state of the economy as "disastrous."⁵⁸

The ill health of the Scottish economy was noted as early as 1954; what was more significant, was the fact that it was lagging behind the rest of Britain by a substantial margin.⁵⁹ Following close behind Ulster, Scotland was the most depressed region in Britain. Incomes averaged eight percent less than the national median. Britain's entry into

the European Economic Community in 1973 hurt the Scots even more. The manufacturing structure and the fishing industry were especially hurt by the new competition.⁶⁰

The legislators in Westminster were unable to buoy up the sinking economy. Attempts at revitalizing the region did not meet with much initial success. In truth, they did try. The Scottish Development Department was set up with the express purpose of bringing new industry to Scotland and rejuvenating the old. These efforts were politically too late; by the late 1960's, the Scots had lost confidence in the London government's ability to solve their economic problems.⁶¹ It is generally believed that the rise in popularity of the SNP during this period was, in part, because of the frustration of the Scottish voters with the established parties. This appears particularly true of the younger voters in the industrial sector of the region. The Labour party, the strongest in Scotland, found this most distressing. The SNP was cutting into its support.

The North Sea oil may not have touched off the nationalist political movement in Scotland, but it certainly gave it a substantial boost. The discovery of oil by British Petroleum in 1970 was considered a godsend throughout the United Kingdom. Before the first barrel was pumped, everyone was planning and spending the revenues from the North Sea well's. With the main fields located off the coast of Scotland, it was not long before the SNP politicized the situation. "It's Scotland's oil" became an

SNP battle cry. Coincidence worked for the nationalists in making the oil a more attractive political weapon. As the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the tensions in the Middle East jacked up the price of crude from six to eight times the 1972 levels, the separatists could easily speculate what the oil could do for an independent Scottish economy.⁶² "Many of the 5.2 million Scots...looked longingly at Norway, where four million people shared seven billion dollars worth of oil and where income taxes had already been reduced."⁶³ "Scottish oil," one man pointed out, "can make Scotland the most prosperous country in Europe, or it can provide temporary relief for the United Kingdom's balance of payments. It can not do both."⁶⁴

The Scottish Nationalists need not have worried. Britain was not about to give up its oil wealth. Though it only accounted for about five percent of the GNP, it also offset ten percent of Britain's import spending. The revenues are being used to pay off part of the country's massive deficits in addition to raising the levels of the public services.⁶⁵ The fact that Britain was holding on to the oil was made clear when the Scotland Bill was presented in Parliament. The bill made no provisions for Scotland to have exclusive rights to the oil. Finances would still be handled in Westminster.

The Scots are benefiting from the oil in one respect. With Aberdeen as the center of the exploration effort and field development, some 55,000 Scottish jobs were created.⁶⁶

This had a positive effect on the local economy. Skeptics, or perhaps one should say, realists, were quick to point out that problems would arise after the exploration and construction phases of the industry were complete. What will be the employment situation after the rigs are built and in place? After initial start-up, oil is not a labor intensive industry. Guy Arnold, in his book, Britain's Oil, notes that the petroleum industry is cutting into other traditional trades. The fishing industry has been particularly degraded since many of the skippers and boats are now used to transport drilling equipment. Will it be able to revive itself after the construction is complete, he wonders? Arnold also ponders the effect oil will have on the patterns of life in the rural areas which have been turned into staging areas and construction sites for the drill rigs. These questions will only be answered by time.⁶⁷

The world-wide proliferation of new states was another contributor to Scotland's political awareness. As previously mentioned, with decolonialization, many of Scotland's sons were without a source of employment. However, the creation of a multitude of new states after the second world war had another effect on Scotland. After witnessing the emergence of so many new states, the proposition of Scotland "going it alone" was not so preposterous. Nationalist demands for independence in Asia and Africa were largely granted after World War II by the

colonial powers. Occasionally this came about after an armed struggle, but quite often, the transition was peaceful. Nationalist forces within Britain, including Wales and Northern Ireland, asked why they should be denied autonomy.

The Scots couldn't buy the argument that they were too small to survive after noting the viability of such states as Comoros, Gambia and Fiji.⁶⁸ Under correct circumstances, the separatists reasoned, Scotland would be economically better off outside the United Kingdom. Aside from the industries, tourism and agriculture, most were counting on at least part of the revenues from the North Sea oil. The SNP used this argument well in their campaigns. Glazer and Moynihan point out the "efficacy of ethnicity in making legitimate claims on the resources of a modern state."⁶⁹

Mention should be made of two other elements which appear to have made an impression on the political activism of the Scots in the late 1960's. Though not as concrete as the discovery of oil or the separatist movement, they do seem to have a bearing on the problem.

The period from the late 1960's to the early 1970's saw a popularization of political agitation through out the world. In the United States, students were demonstrating to end the war in Viet Nam. The summer of 1968 saw Soviet tanks in Prague as the Czechs made a bid for greater freedom in their country. Chile was nearing a state of panic with the election of Salvador Allende and the leftist government.

Closer to home, the problems in Northern Ireland were reaching crisis proportions with rioting in the streets; general worker strikes were held throughout the United Kingdom. These events, and others, probably had the positive effect of sensitizing the Scots.

All of these factors were linked together in the evening news. The media, particularly television, aided in spreading this awareness of the strength of political activism. In The Nationalist Movement in Scotland, Jack Brand comments that: "The arrival of Scottish Television (STV) meant that more Scottish material was presented and with it more Scottish news and current affairs." He also points out that before STV started up in 1956, the London controlled BBC did not give adequate coverage of local Scottish current events.⁷⁰ The number of independent Scottish television stations increased in the 1960's and all dispensed a greater proportion of Scottish news. In addition, the greater availability of television appears to have increased the average Scottish citizen's awareness of the political unrest in other parts of the region and the world.

The press has always been active in Scotland. The circulation of local and regional papers is far and away greater than the circulation of the London papers sent north. This is only natural, since regional coverage would be more extensive.⁷¹ Though the newspaper influenced the average Scot's perceptions of his surroundings, it does not

appear to have had the impact that television did. Also, most of the newspapers treated the SNP and other nationalist groups rather lightly until the late 1960's.

The separatist movement and the Devolution Bill, the North Sea oil, international activism and the media all influenced the Scots in their demonstration of ethnicity. By the late 1970's, however, political affairs regarding Scot's rights and separatism had quieted down remarkably. Several reasons appear responsible for this return to relative normalcy.

Kellas points out that there is a cautious optimism in Scotland concerning the health of the economy. New industries, including aircraft and automobile plants and electrical engineering concerns are moving into the Glasgow-Edinburgh belt. Also, some older firms are trying to turn around and change to newer technologies. The profits from the North Sea oil are beginning to be felt in the region.⁷² Granted, this is not at the rate the political extremists would like, but it is enough to give the people new hope.

Politically, the Labour Party remains, as it has been in recent times, the premier party in the region. The Conservatives are back at being the number two party after the SNP nudged them out of that spot early in the 1970's. For its part, the SNP is still a viable pressure group, but it has lost much of its previous clout.

A lesson was learned during the Scots flirtation with independence. No matter what the rhetoric, most Scots appear sincerely to have wanted to remain in the Union. Two hundred and fifty plus years of close association with the English has built up a strong sense of loyalty among most Scots with the concept of "Greater Britain". Many considered the possible destruction of the British state too large a price to pay for separatism.⁷³ Additionally, some pragmatists noted that they were not so sure they wanted a government run by a Glasgow majority; or one so close to home.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that there is a strong Scottish ethnicity. This group was formed through centuries of common association and shared history. Much of Scotland's nationalism has surfaced because of the positive and negative associations with the English. While the English have often been arrogant and treated the Scots with a somewhat cavalier attitude, they seldom deny the contributions that the Scots have made to British history or the character of Britain. Perhaps it is these perceptions that are at the core of most of the problems between Scotland and England. England's almost natural arrogance may stem from some sort of national character flaw or it could be a result of their belief that they are the "superior" partner in their relations with the Scots living and working in that "provincial region" to the north.

For their part, the Scots have often, especially in their political dealings with London, projected themselves as the aggrieved junior partner who is not getting his fair share. The Scots, as a nationalist group, will continue to militate against perceived inequities within the system.

The British government has been slow to accept the fact that Scottish problems require an understanding of ethnic self-determination. Ethnicity is a reasonably new concept

in terms of socio-political relations. Many in Westminster are beginning to realize that nationalism may be a continuation of the "class-struggle"-style of political activism of the late 1800's. That is to say, nationalism may be a new strategy for voicing discontent with the perceived inequities by an interest group. Glazer and Moynihan illustrate this concept: "A British Prime Minister who does 'something for the workers' probably doesn't do much and almost certainly does even less for his party. Doing something for the Scots, however, becomes an increasingly attractive and real option for Westminster. That much in the way of resources can be found, and the Scots are likely to know about it and consider it a positive gain, at least past the point of the next general election."⁷⁴

Ethnicity is much more than a political expression. But in the context of Scotland's relations with Britain, it must be viewed in that arena. In my research, I could find no examples of overt racial strife between the English and the Scots. Scotsmen working and living south of the border were never subjected to mass pogroms of extermination or harsh repressive measures.

Indications point to a reasonably quiet period in the near future for the Scots and English. However, in the event of a major imbalance in resources, we must assume that

the Scots will again become politically active under the banner of nationalism.

SELECTED STATES WHICH CHANGED
RELATIONS WITH UNITED KINGDOM
1944-1970

Present name of state or colony	Date acquired (approximate)	Date of autonomy
Burma	1826	1948
Cyprus	1878	1960
Gambia	1661	1965
Ghana (Gold Coast)	1821	1957
Guyana (Br. Guiana)	1796	1966
India	1757	1947
Jamaica	1655	1962
Kenya	1887	1963
Malaya	1786	1957
Malta	1800	1964
Mauritius	1815	1968
Nigeria	1861	1960
Palestine (Israel)	1917	1948
Singapore	1918	1963
South Africa	1795+	1960
Namibia (S.W. Africa)	1915	1960
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1815	1948
Sudan	1898	1954
Tanganyika (Tanzania)	1919	1961
Zanzibar	1870	1963
Uganda	1888	1962
Zambia	1889	1964

source: T. O. Lloyd, 1984

TABLE 1

ENDNOTES

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